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A B S T R A C TThe effects of orphan drug policies raise serious concerns among payer
organizations and lead to often-tragic disappointment for patients who
are denied much anticipated drug reimbursements. We evaluate the
effects of orphan drug policies on the basis of this concern for real
accessibility to drugs. We highlight two unforeseen effects of orphan
drug policies: 1) they provide unique business opportunities for manu-
facturers and 2) drugs approved through these policies are often
inaccessible because of their high price. We identify six causes of this
emergence of effects. The first four are the direct result of incentives
included in orphan drug policies. The fifth cause is the ‘‘off-label’’ use ofnt matter Copyright & 2012, International Society
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ndence to: Andre´ Coˆte´, Faculte´ des sciences de l’adorphan drugs. These emergent effects have several implications: 1) they
raise doubts about the equity of access to drugs, 2) they highlight the
limitations of the cohort paradigm in medicine, and c) they force third-
party payers to make drugs accessible even when the prices of drugs are
believed to be disproportionate to the clinical effects obtained.
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The United States, Japan, Australia, and the European Union have
all adopted policies promoting the development and commercia-
lization of drugs that target so-called orphan diseases. The stated
purpose of these policies was to meet the needs of patients with
rare diseases. Fiscal and economic incentives were put in place to
ensure the development of market niches whose profit potential
would have been close to zero had changes to legislative and
regulatory frameworks not been made [1–3]. The will to ensure
a fair access to treatment of patients, whatever the prevalence of
their disease [4], is the moral foundation of these policies.
The prevalence threshold defining a rare disease, in order for
it to benefit from the advantages of orphan status, is established,
in relative terms, at fewer than 5 persons per 10,000 inhabitants
(Europe) or, in absolute terms, at fewer than 200,000 persons
(United States) [4–6]. To these epidemiological criteria are added
economic considerations. A drug receives orphan designation if
it is used to treat a disease whose prevalence is so low that, in
absence of incentives, commercializing the drug would unlikely
generate sufficient revenues to absorb the costs related to its
development and marketing [4,7,8].
As for the second point, many authors point out that some
drugs that received the orphan status have nevertheless had a
financial return that significantly outmatched the investments
involved [2,3,9]. For some, these cases remain exceptional and are
nothing but evidence for the effectiveness of policies that havebeen put in place [10]. For some others, these instances are more
and more numerous [2], and they think that some revisions are
necessary to give back these policies their original spirit [7].
Nearly 30 years after the introduction of the first law, the
Orphan Drug Act in the United States, a critical assessment is in
order. Have these policies met their objectives as regards avail-
ability and accessibility? In other words, do they really ensure
a fair access to treatment in agreement with the common will of
the different governments that are involved?
Taking into account concerns about availability, accessibility,
and fairness in access to treatment at the same time, we discuss
the real effect of the incentives planned in the policies on orphan
drugs. To do this, we will describe the main effects brought about
by these policies. In the context of our discussion, we adopt the
following definitions: availability refers to the drug being
approved by a national authority. As for accessibility, it is defined
as ‘‘The degree to which individuals are inhibited or facilitated in
their ability to gain entry to and to receive care and services from
the health care system. Factors influencing this ability include
geographic, architectural, transportational, and financial consid-
erations, among others.’’ In the medical setting, fairness is defined
with respect to the aim of providing citizens with equal access to
health resources, which matches their actual health. Fairness
requires a positive action by the state when the market does not
provide a good match between investments and heath needs.
Finally, fairness requires that the barriers to access should be
morally justifiable.for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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emergence of these effects. Finally, as the national governments
cover a major part of the expenditures in health care, we will
highlight several implications of orphan drug policies of our
public health systems.
We opted for a research design of the qualitative and inductive
type. Our methodological approach was grounded theory. Our
empirical material consisted of a combination of objective/subjec-
tive and qualitative/quantitative data from three main sources: 1)
the remarks and comments of practitioners, 2) statistical data, and
3) factual and analytical elements from the scientific literature.
Analytical work was conducted simultaneously with empirical work.The Beneficial Impact of the Policies on Orphan Drugs
The beneficial effects induced by the policies on orphan drugs are
beyond dispute, especially as regards the availability of new
molecules. In the United States, 353 orphan drugs were allowed
to be marketed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from
January 1983 to May 2010 [11]. In Europe, 65 drugs received the
same authorization from January 2010 to July 2011 [12].
Moreover, many authors stress the contribution of these
policies, especially the extension of and improvement in quality
of life, the acquisition of new knowledge about other types of
illnesses, the considerable boon to the industry, especially in
biotechnology, and the accelerated processing of drug approval
applications [1,6,9,10,13,14].
Nonetheless, the availability of such molecules is limited to
a few therapeutic families, namely, those that offer a significant
turnover. Moreover, though they are available, these molecules
are not necessarily accessible because of their high price. How-
ever, these policies turned out to be real business opportunities
for manufacturers, especially in favoring the emergence of
‘‘Blockbuster’’ of a new kind. We will develop each of these three
points in the next few paragraphs.
Concentration in Commercially Lucrative Therapeutic Areas
Classification by therapeutic class of 353 orphan drugs, approved by
the FDA between January 1983 and May 2010, indicates that five
therapeutic classes account for 75% of the market for orphan drugs.
In fact, 95 are specifically from the oncology/cancer therapeutic
class. This is followed, in descending order, by metabolic disorders
(54), hematology (41), infectious diseases (41), and neurological
disorders (30). The remaining 25%, 92 of the 353 orphan drugs
approved by the FDA, are distributed among the other 11 therapeu-
tic classes, which include psychiatric, musculoskeletal, gastroin-
testinal, dermatologic, respiratory, ophthalmologic, hepatic/biliary,
immunology, cardiovascular, and genitourinary disorders, and
drugs for the treatment of intoxications/envenomations. The con-
centration is even more significant in Europe, where 42 (65%) of the
65 orphan drugs approved are specifically from two therapeutic
classes, oncology/cancer (29) and metabolic disorders (13) [12].
Gavel [15] provides an explanation of this phenomenon by
showing that drugs used to treat cancer are, by far, the most
profitable. Seachrist [16] and Casali [17] argue in the same
direction, indicating that this profitability can be explained, at
least in part, by the frequent off-label use of these drugs.
Also, according to our data, 33 of the 353 orphan molecules
that received FDA market authorization between 1983 and 2010
were not marketed or were withdrawn for commercial or safety
reasons. Note that 12 of these had no therapeutic equivalents
in the target indication. As for the remaining 21, alternatives
existed (same pharmacological agents) but were not approved for
other therapeutic indications: 13 were approved under the same
trade name, and 8 were available as generics.Medicines Available But Not Accessible Because of Their High
Price
Orphan drugs are extremely expensive. Cerezyme, developed by
Genzyme for the treatment of Gaucher disease, is the example
most often cited. This treatment, which in the case of the United
States, targets approximately 2000 patients, is one of the most
expensive in the world. In fact, it costs between $100,000 and
$400,000 per year depending on the age of the patient (child or
adult) [18]. Another example, Agalsidase Beta, marketed by the
US company Genzyme under the name Fabrazyme and indicated
for the treatment of Fabry disease, costs about $300,000 per
patient annually [10].
These few examples are far from representing isolated cases.
The prices charged for these new orphan drugs frequently exceed
the usual pharmacoeconomics scales and the thresholds of social
acceptability. Such escalation consequently raises concerns and
leads to major problems: concerns by payer organizations, and
tragic disappointment for patients who are denied much antici-
pated drug reimbursements. In fact, although drugs have
received market approval, they may likely not be reimbursed,
where consequently patients may not have access to them unless
they pay for them themselves.
A Highly Lucrative Opportunity for Manufacturers
In a report titled Opportunities in Orphan Drugs— Strategies for
Developing Maximum Returns from Niche Indications published
for Business Insights Ltd., Thornton [11] suggests that manufac-
turers have an incentive to abandon the traditional business
model based on the mass sale of drugs intended for general care
treatment and to turn to targeted drugs with high commercial
potential. The author bases his advice, on the one hand, on the
increasing difficulty of manufacturers to market mass drugs and
future ‘‘blockbusters,’’ and, on the other hand, on the high
profitability of orphan drugs.
Compilation of the whole population of the orphan molecules
indicates that several molecules that have benefited from incen-
tives provided in the US Orphan Drug Act and/or the European
Union orphan drug policy have received substantial return of
investment. In fact, 43 trademarks, each for the treatment of
at least one orphan designation, generated global annual sales
exceeding $1 billion in 2008. Of these, 18 products were intended
solely for the treatment of a rare disease and 11 achieved global
annual sales equal to or greater than $1 billion during the 7-year
exclusivity period granted by the FDA (Table 1).
Furthermore, compilation indicates that 33 trademarks, each
corresponding to at least one orphan indication, achieved global
annual sales of $100 million to $999 million in 2008. Of these, 19 were
approved for orphan applications, 7 had global annual sales of $100
million to $199 million, 9 had global annual sales of $200 million to
$299 million, 5 had global annual sales of $300 million to $399
million, 3 had global annual sales of $400 million to $499 million, 5
had global annual sales of $500 million to 599 million, and 3 had
global annual sales of $600 million to $999 million in 2008 (Table 2).Some Explanatory Factors
We identified six factors that explain the deviation of the
programs that originally aimed to restore fairness for people
stricken with rare diseases toward unique business opportunities
for manufacturers. These explanatory factors are as follows: Fast-tracking the development and marketing of these new
molecules Appreciable support for biotechnology companies
 Excessive stratification of therapeutic indications
Table 1 – Drugs obtaining at least one orphan designation and having sales of more than $1 billion in 2008.
Trade name Generic name Year of orphan
designation
Year of market
approval
Number of therapeutic
designations
Humira Adalimumab 2005 2008 2
Fosamax Alendronate 2001 2
Ceredase Alglucerase 1985 1991 2
Abilify Aripiprazole 2006 1
Avastin Bevacizumab 2003 4
Velcade Bortezomib 2003 2003 2
Tracleer Bosentan 2000 2001 2
Botox Botulinum toxin 1984 1989 4
Novoseven Coagulation factor 1988 1999 10
Epogen Epoetin alfa 1986 1989 2
Procrit Epoetin alfa 1987 3
Enbrel Etanercept 1998 1999 2
Neupogen Filgrastim 1990 1994 6
Neurontin Gabapentin 1995 1
Copaxone Glatiramer acetate 1987 1996 2
Gleevec Imatinib 2001 2001 7
Cerezyme Imiglucerase 1991 1994 1
Remicade Infliximab 1995 1998 6
Betaseron Interferon 1988 1993 2
Avonex Interferon 1991 1996 2
Rebif Interferon 1992 2
Lamictal Lamotrigine 1995 1998 1
Revlimid Lenalidomide 2001 2006 4
Lupron Leuprolide 1988 1993 1
Mobic Meloxicam 2002 2005 1
Provigil Modafinil 1993 1998 1
CellCept Mycophenolate 2006 1
Sandostatin Octreotide 1998 1998 3
Kogenate Octocog 1989 1993 2
Taxol Paclitaxel 1997 1997 1
Pegasys Peginterferon 1998 2
Alimta Pemetrexed 2001 2004 1
Mirapex Pramipexole 2008 1
Evista Raloxifene 2005 2007 1
Rituxan Rituximab 1994 1997 4
Vioxx Rofecoxib 2004 1
Prograf Tacrolimus 1998 2006 2
Cialis Tadalafil 2006 1
Temodar Temozolomide 1998 1999 2
Spiriva) Tiotropium 2008 1
Topamax Topiramate 1992 2001 1
Herceptin Trastuzumab 1999 1
Zometa Zoledronic acid 2000 2001 1
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 Pricing based on willingness to pay from patients and/or
third-party payers
 Off-label practiceFast-tracking
Orphan drug policies represent a fast track for manufacturers
eager to replenish their pipeline of new drugs. Since Merck’s
withdrawal of Vioxx in 2004 and Pfizer’s withdrawal of Bextra in
2005, this avenue has become increasingly attractive. Indeed,
since that time, regulatory agencies have tightened their criteria
for marketing approval, requiring, in particular, an increased
number of clinical trials. This tightening has been translated
into both a longer time to complete clinical trials and an
increased number of refusals or volunteer withdrawals [18].Obtaining an orphan designation allows companies to over-
come these obstacles. In fact, the FDA has shown considerable
leeway in applying approval criteria for drugs intended for the
treatment of serious and debilitating diseases that result in
reserved vital prognoses and for which no other adequate
therapy exists. Most orphan drugs meet these criteria. In such
cases, manufacturers may invoke an emergency and request
a review of compliance with conditions. The drug in question
may obtain market authorization before the normally required
end of clinical trials subject to compliance with the conditions set
out in the compliance notice. Among these conditions, new
clinical trials are usually required. When an emergency cannot
be cited, manufacturers may, in the United States, benefit from
the expertise of the FDA by taking advantage of the orphan drug
approval assistance program provided by the Orphan Drug Act.
The consequent exchange of information results in faster pro-
cessing of both clinical trial evaluations and approval notices [19].
Table 2 – Drugs obtaining at least one orphan designation and having sales between $100 million and $999 million in 2008.
Trade name Generic name Year of orphan
designation
Year of market
approval
Number of
therapeutic
designations
Sales
(million US $)
Replagal Alpha-galactosidase A 1998 1 176
Myozyme Alpha-glucosidase 1997 2006 1 296
Activase/Cathflo Alteplase 2003 1 286
AmBisome Amphotericin B 1996 1997 3 290
Strattera Atomoxetine 2003 1 580
Vidaza Azacitidine 2001 2004 2 207
Dysport Botulinum toxin A 1989 3 199
Subutex/
Suboxone
Buprenorphine 1994 2002 1 230
Fabrazyme Ceramide
trihexosidase
1988 2003 1 500
Erbitux Cetuximab 2000 2006 2 749
Sensipar Cinacalcet 2003 2004 1 597
Exjade Deferasirox 2002 2005 1 531
Sprycel Desatinib 2005 2006 2 310
Pulmozyme Dornase alfa 1991 1993 1 305
Marinol Dronabinol 1991 1992 1 190
Aromasin Exemestane 1991 1999 1 465
Fludara Fludarabine phosphate 1989 1991 2 140
Elaprase Idursulfase 2001 2006 1 305
Intron A Interferon alfa-2b 1987 1988 10 234
Somatuline Lanreotide 2000 2007 1 170
Aldurazyme Laronidase 1997 2003 1 151
Lialda Mesalamine 2008 1 140
Pegintron Peginterferon alfa-2b 2008 1 914
Rebetol Ribavirin 2003 2003 1 260
Actonel Risedronate 2006 1 462
Humatrope Somatropin 1986 1987 3 441
Genotropin Somatropin 1994 1997 3 898
Nutropin Somatropin 1987 1985 5 375
Nexavar Sorafenib 2004 2005 3 647
Thalomid Thalidomide 1995 1998 4 505
Tobi Tobramycin 1994 1997 2 295
Remodulin Treprostinil 1997 2002 1 270
Decapeptyl Triptorelin pamoate 1990 1 347
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Orphan drug policies also represent an opportunity for biotech-
nology companies, especially those involved in the development
of proteins, enzymes, and antibodies. The heavy dependence of
most young biotechs on private research and development (R&D)
investment funds ensures that the promise of 7-year exclusivity
remains attractive.
A biotech that obtains orphan designation attracts interest
from investors because of the clinical potential of the molecule
being developed, the financial incentives accompanying the
designation (grants, tax credits), and the potential economic
spin-offs [11]. Furthermore, through its Office of Orphan Products
Development, the FDA provides various financial, technical, and
information support services to orphan designation developers
for the design of clinical trials and for assistance in the prepara-
tion of approval applications.
In this regard, our data indicates that of the 353 orphan drugs
approved by the FDA, 178 were from the biotechnology industry
and 175 were from pharmaceutical companies. It should also be
noted that several biotechnology companies, including Amgen,
Genentech, and Genzyme, began to do business following the
approval of an orphan drug.Excessive Stratification
The approval of a drug that has previously obtained orphan
designation for several therapeutic indications significantly
increases its profitability. It is, according to Thornton [11], ‘‘the
main strategy for expanding revenues for drugs with orphan
designation.’’
Two possibilities are thus presented to manufacturers wishing to
increase the number of indications of a drug and, consequently,
significantly increase the number of patients likely to be prescribed
the drug. The first is to expand the number of orphan indications.
This approach allows companies to obtain product exclusivity for the
treatment of specific diseases. This is the case of Glaive (United
States) and Glove (Europe and Australia), a drug developed by
Novartis (imatinib mesylate), which has one orphan indication for
chronic myeloid leukemia and another for the treatment of gastro-
intestinal stoma tumors, two diseases considered rare.
Manufacturers may get approval for the same molecule for
different therapeutic indications, whether orphan or routine. We
cite the example of Epogen (epoetin alfa), the first drug marketed
by Biotech Amgen in 1989. This medication is used to treat
anemia during the terminal phase of renal failure. Despite a
prevalence of fewer than 78,000 patients, Epogen generated sales
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Amgem’s having the drug approved as well for high-prevalence
therapeutic indications, including the recovery of red blood cells
in patients suffering from bone marrow suppression caused by
anti-HIV drugs or chemotherapy, and reducing the need for
transfusions in surgery patients [10].
Compilation shows that of the 43 orphan drugs approved by
the FDA whose global annual sales reached more than $1 billion,
18 had only one orphan designation, 15 had two, and 10 had three
and more (Table 1), for 97 orphan indications. The picture is the
same for 33 products achieving global annual sales of $100
million to 999 million in 2008 and used as the active pharma-
ceutical agent for 64 orphan indications (Table 1).
For example, the molecule interferon is marketed under nine
brand names and has received 33 orphan designations. Three of these
brands—Betaseron (Chiron), Avonex (Biogen), and Rebif (Pfizer)—
received market approval from the FDA for six therapeutic indica-
tions, and all became blockbusters. The case is not unique (Table 1).
It is clear from our analysis that actual legislations trigger
a three-step strategy: 1) apply for orphan designation, obtain
substantial economic benefits during the development, approval,
and marketing phases, and demand a high price because of the
low prevalence of the initial target population; 2) after approval,
convince doctors to use the drug in their practice; and 3) expand
sales by obtaining new therapeutic indications, orphan or other-
wise, while maintaining the initial price.
Opportunity to Give New Profitability to Obsolete Molecules
Manufacturers who recycle old drugs can benefit from the
economic incentives provided for in orphan drug policies, in
particular, 7-year commercial exclusivity. Note, in this regard,
that Vioxx (rofecoxib) was granted a second life as an orphan drug
for much more restricted indications. From 1983 to 2010, 26 active
agents previously approved by the FDA for other indications
received orphan designation. Fourteen of the 26 active ingredients
in recycled obsolete orphan drugs have received market approval.
While the benefits for patients are undeniable, the prices
charged for recycled molecules are nevertheless surprisingly high
in some cases. As an example, arsenic trioxide, an old inexpen-
sive molecule used for treating cough, leprosy, and even syphilis,
was shown to be effective in the second-line treatment of acute
promyelocytic leukemia in the 1990s. The total cost of treatment
is around $50,000. The same scenario is true for N-carbamylglu-
tamate, a pharmaceutical agent used to compensate for a deficit
in N-acetylglutamate synthase, which, since it was approved as
an orphan drug, saw its price increase from $15 per gram to
$367.30, or $5,611 to $132,774 per patient per year for life [20].
Pricing Based on Willingness to Pay from Patients and/or
Third-Party Payers
To justify these high prices, manufacturers equally cite R&D invest-
ments, the cost of acquiring and processing the active ingredient,
marketing costs, andweak demand [14,21,22]. The cost of developing
Cerezyme, however, which offers the same properties as Ceradaze
using a recombinant that is much less expensive to produce, is
valued at $30 million [1]. According to McCabe et al. [18], production
and marketing costs are insignificant for this drug. Ceredase
(alglucerase) was discovered and developed by scientists at the
National Institutes of Health in the 1970s and was approved by the
FDA following clinical trials conducted and funded by the latter [3].
In general, R&D costs for orphan drugs are 25% of the costs of
standard drugs [11]. In addition, manufacturers can quickly
recover their investment by obtaining a conditional approval for
the orphan molecule [11]. The costs associated with clinical trials
are also low due to the small number of patients involved. On thebasis of information collected from the ClinicalTrials.gov data-
base, Thornton [11] established at 124 the average number of
patients recruited for phase III clinical trials of orphan drugs.
Furthermore, Thornton states that some phase III trials are
conducted with samples as small as 15 patients, while others
are the result of combining a trial from a previous phase (e.g.,
combined phase II/III clinical trials) [11].
Costs associated with the sale of orphan drugs are also
insignificant. Patients with rare diseases are, for the most part,
referred to and followed by teams of specialists, doctors, and
pharmacists in tertiary hospitals. Specialists are exposed to the
marketing of orphan drugs on a regular basis through their
clinical activities, teaching activities, and research activities,
and through their participation in international meetings.
Finally, it is worthwhile to note the contribution of patient
organizations in the funding, research, and development of
orphan molecules. For example, the American Cystic Fibrosis
Foundation has invested more than $300 million in the develop-
ment of nearly all treatments approved in the United States for
this rare disease. The foundation is actively involved in the
subsidizing of 37 newmolecules currently under development [11].
On the basis of these data, we conclude that pricing is based
on what patients and/or third-party payers are willing to pay.
Because orphan molecules are targeted at a captive market and
have no therapeutic equivalents, third-party payer organizations
have little room for maneuver and often resign themselves to
accepting the manufacturer’s suggested price, all the more so
because they are subjected both to the influence of the media and
to pressure from patient associations [12].
Off-Label Practice
The use of drugs for therapeutic indications other than those
specified in their monographs significantly increases the profitability
of orphan molecules. It is estimated that nearly 20% of the prescrip-
tions in the United States are off-label. This percentage increases to
50% for oncology and is even higher for pediatrics, especially
pediatric oncology [23–25]. As noted previously, 95 of the 353 (27%)
orphan drugs approved by the FDA between January 1983 and May
2010 are specifically from the oncology/cancer therapeutic class.
Cohen andWilson [26] note that 10 of the 14 orphan drugs in their
study of monoclonal antibodies include one or several additional off-
label indications. The authors cite the example of infliximab, an
orphan drug originally approved for the treatment of Crohn’s disease
(1995) and later, in 2003, for treating patients with rheumatoid and
psoriatic arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis, and ulcerative colitis. Like-
wise, infliximab is prescribed for various off-label therapeutic indica-
tions, some of which are in the process of approval, in particular for
the treatment of juvenile idiopathic arthritis and uveitis.Implications for Public Health Systems
We will now highlight several implications of orphan drug
policies, some of which call into question the management, even
the very foundations, of our public health systems. Our discus-
sion will focus on three issues: Access to orphan drugs
 A prelude to individualized medicine
 An impossible ‘‘formula’’Access to Orphan Drugs
Until now, the refusal of public health programs to reimburse for
drugs otherwise known to be effective has been, almost entirely,
a moot issue. Today, this is no longer the case.
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access is regarded as a fundamental principle, access to orphan
drugs is seen as a right by patients and families and, in return, an
obligation for managers of public health programs. With technolo-
gical and scientific advances, however, the number of treatments
and treatable patients is rising. This, coupled with the high cost of
treatment, has an increasingly significant impact on national
budgets devoted to the reimbursement of drugs, so much so that
one fears that it may jeopardize the viability of these programs. ‘‘The
French and Dutch analyses predict that the total cost of ODs per
country will reach 6-8% of total budgets by 2010’’ [12].
A Prelude to Individualized Medicine
By responding positively to the various requests made by patients
affected by rare diseases, third-party payers are obliged to cover
the astronomical costs of individualized medicine developed and
evaluated in a system based on cohort medicine.
The selection criteria for choosing a molecule in cohort
medicine are need, prevalence, and cost/benefit ratio. In this
sense, public health programs choose among the available drugs
that best meet the needs of target populations on the basis of
pharmacoeconomic efficacy and value. In the case of rare
diseases, cohorts recruited for research sometimes represent all
the eligible individuals of a given target population. The small
number of patients, and their concentration in tertiary facilities
where research normally takes place, explains why target popu-
lations and research cohorts tend to be the same. In this context,
patients responding well to treatment are known. It then
becomes particularly odious to refuse reimbursement to these
patients on the basis of a problem of efficacy within the cohort.
In such situations, the criteria used in cohort medicine for
selecting molecules are difficult to apply.
In other words, supply is justified by imposing accessibility
criteria, whereas equitable access, often perceived as a right to
unlimited access, would otherwise seem compromised. More-
over, governments risk giving the impression that they are
insensitive to the suffering of citizens.
An Impossible ‘‘Formula’’
Indeed, agencies that manage drug formularies are not obliged to
include, in the formularies, all drugs approved by the national
authority. The drawing up of the list of the Drug Formulary
implies that choices must be made.
Three main factors guide these choices: medical necessity,
efficacy, and cost. The paradigm governing these choices is
evidence-based medicine. In general, this paradigm is valid for
approval, inclusion, and prescription. However, approving agen-
cies have special programs that allow ‘‘promising’’ products to be
approved according to criteria that play in the favor of orphan
drugs. Such programs respond positively to requests from patient
groups seeking faster access to these products, even if it means
assuming risk at an individual level. Products approved through
these programs, however, risk being denied reimbursement
because of weak evidence. The decision not to include a drug,
when therapeutic alternatives exist, normally does not create
many waves. This is not the case for serious diseases for which
there is no specific treatment. The willingness to pay is high
because of the seriousness of the disease, the absence of alter-
natives, and the possibility of identifying the individuals and
families affected by the decision. The very possibility of improving
the condition of patients seems, on the surface, to be justification
enough.
The problem is even more glaring when it involves patients who
after participating in a clinical trial continue treatment as part of a
compassionate program. An approval following a refusal ofreimbursement may mean the end of the compassionate program,
because the company can claim to have fulfilled its obligation
under the Helsinki Declaration to supply the drug for subjects who
have responded positively to experimental treatment.
Such delays place intense pressure on tertiary centers that
use these expensive drugs and may consider themselves morally
obligated to ensure the continuity of treatment from their own
budgets.Conclusions
Throughout this article, we have highlighted the shortcomings
of orphan drug policies in view of the original concerns of the
legislator, namely, the availability and accessibility of therapies
for the treatment of rare diseases as well as fairness in access to
treatment. Our goal here was not to question the merits of such
policies, but rather to seek to understand how programs that are
presented, at first glance, as philanthropic or humanitarian
programs have, in fact, changed into business opportunities.
Measures that aim to speed up commercialization allow
manufacturers eager to replenish their pipeline of new drugs to
escape new rules aimed at tightening approval criteria.
Some incentives, such as those based on the protection of
intellectual property, promote the concentration of marketing
activities in a few profitable therapeutic areas at the expense of
others that are equally, if not more, important. Orphan drug
policies have the paradoxical effect of creating new orphan
patients!
These incentives also promote the creation of new drugs at
prices that are so high that the actual accessibility of these drugs
for patients is very often an illusion. Accessibility is determined
by one’s economic status or one’s coverage by private or public
health insurance. Citizens may perceive this inequality in access
to these drugs as inequality among sickness areas. This inequal-
ity is perceived as violating fairness.
Finally, the combined effect of high prices, excessive stratifi-
cation of therapeutic indications, off-label use of orphan drugs,
and market exclusivity for 7 years provides manufacturers with
yet another opportunity in their strategic arsenal for marketing
extremely profitable molecules, indeed for developing new
blockbusters.
In short, by eliminating manufacturers from the competitive
arena, notably by granting them a 7-year period of commercial
monopoly, do we not encourage them to pursue a policy of
excessive pricing? Moreover, is it reasonable to grant 7-year market
exclusivity for a product whose R&D costs are probably significantly
lower in comparison with those required by a new molecule?
The observed effects are incompatible with the stated goals of
orphan drug policies. These effects contrast with the image
widely conveyed in the literature depicting orphan drugs as
having little financial attractiveness [27].
That companies favor the most profitable niches seems
inevitable. In fact, should we be surprised? On the other hand,
in a perspective in which the priorities of orphan drug policies
were determined by the number of patients affected, and
adjusted according to the seriousness of the disease, would the
targets favored by manufacturers be the same?
Moreover, in a perspective in which a society has a limited
amount of resources and, therefore, must decide how to dis-
tribute these resources among its members, access to orphan
drugs at a high price confronts managers of health systems with
fundamental ethical questions insofar as our collective identity
is defined by principles, which are here being undermined.
In conclusion, we believe that the development of a more
integrative knowledge is desirable, even necessary, to better
VA L U E I N H E A LT H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 1 1 8 5 – 1 1 9 1 1191understand these distortions and to restore to orphan drug
policies the legitimacy of their primary objectives.Acknowledgment
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